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Swell Damage and the Right of Navigation
Frank R. Grundman*

A

returned from a pleasant day of recreational
motorboating. Shortly after disembarking, he heard a loud
report and returned to the moorings to find his craft tossing
about like a cork. Several side planks had been fractured when
the vessel was thrown against the dock pilings. In the distance
there was an ocean steamer throwing a large white bow wave
making her resemble a dog with a bone in its teeth. The heartbroken yachtsman barely made out the words "I. M. MADDOG,
Wilmington, Del." written across her stern. He sued.
The 80th Congress, by statute, resolved a longstanding
anomaly in procedural law by bringing all such suits into admiralty and by recognizing a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it.' In years to come, the fedNOVICE BOATER

* B.S. in Engineering, U. S. Coast Guard Academy; Lieutenant, U.S.C.G.,
assigned to the Marine Inspection Office, Cleveland, Ohio, as a Material Inspector and Casualty and Personal Injury Investigating Officer. Second-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 The Judiciary Act of 1789 bestowed exclusive admiralty jurisdiction on
the District Courts but saved "to suitors, in all cases the right of a common
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." In essence,
this holds true today (28 U. S. C. § 1333); however it is recognized as a
duality of maritime jurisdiction, with the District Courts having original
jurisdiction. Gilmore & Black, Law of Admiralty 33-36 (1957). Unfortunately, tort jurisdiction in admiralty did not originally extend to damage
caused on land. The Plymouth, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). However, the
80th Congress passed into law a statute providing that admiralty jurisdiction shall extend to all cases of damage or injury to persons or property
caused by a vessel on the navigable waters "notwithstanding that such
damage or injury was done or consummated on land." 62 Stat. 496 (1948);
46 U. S. C. § 740; U. S. v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F. 2d 610 (9th Cir.
1953). Admiralty jurisdiction extends to every species of tort committed
upon the navigable waters or high seas. Holland, Amphibious Torts, and
an Act for Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 5 N. Y. U. Intra. L. Rev. 1
(1949). Vogel, Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, 16 Brooklyn L. Rev. 191 (1950). Fauver, Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction to Include Amphibious Torts, 37 Georgetown L. J. 252 (1949). See also Salaky
v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. N. Y. 1953) (damage
to motorboats from an oil sludge). Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R. Co.
v. The W. C. Harms and H. W. A. Harms, 134 F. Supp. 636 (S. D. Tex.
1954) (Collision between train and barge). Diamond State Tel. Co. v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 205 F. 2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1953) (vessel damage to submarine cable). However, negligent damage to ship's cargo on land is not
a maritime tort. Tennant Sons & Co. v. Norddeutscher Lloyd and Steamship Kassel, 220 F. Supp. 448 (E. D. La. 1963), and compare with Spann v.
J. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204, 1965 A. M. C. 1192 (3rd Cir. 1965) where a longshoreman, standing on a pier, was injured by a defective mechanism of a
shore based unloading hopper (being filled by a shore based crane) and
yet recovered under a warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel because it
had sufficient connection with the operation of the ship.
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eral courts will probably be severely taxed with swell-damage
suits because of the phenomenal growth of recreational boating.
No one knows precisely, but estimates are that there are approximately eight million pleasure craft afloat today, compared
with less than half a million at the close of World War 11.2 The
necessity for a standard test of a vessel's liability for swell damage is obvious and imperative.
Aside from the criminal aspect,' an action for damages based
upon negligence seems to fit the situation. However, any discussion relating to swell-damage of a moored vessel must of
necessity be broadened to include damage to shore installations
and to vessels under way, since the same principles of law are
4
applicable.
In general, an owner of a vessel or other property damaged
by the tortious acts of another committed in the course of boating or shipping is entitled to recover for such injuries.5 But
what of the time-honored doctrine of the paramount right of
navigation? 6 It has been said that a moving ship is not an inBroach, Boating Safety-Everyone's Business, in: Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council, U. S. Coast Guard, April 1961; Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 661 (1963); Norris, The
Land Lubber Takes to the Water, 37 Temp. L. Q. 375 (1964); Auten, Federal and State Regulation of Boating: The Role of the U. S. Coast Guard
and State Agencies in the Promotion of Boating Safety, 37 Temp. L. Q. 446
(1964).
2

3 Reckless

or negligent operation deemed a misdemeanor,

46 U. S. C.

§ 526(m), providing for a fine up to $2000.00 or imprisonment for a term

not exceeding one year or both. In lieu of this, a penalty may be prescribed, 46 U. S. C. § 526(0). Administrative suspension and revocation
proceedings may be instituted against a license or certificate holder for
incompetency, misconduct, negligence, or for any act in violation of the
provisions of Title 52 of the Revised Statutes; 46 U. S. C. § 239. See also
Inland Rules of the Road, 33 U. S. C. §§ 154-232; Great Lakes Rules, 33
U. S. C. §§ 241-295; Western Rivers Rules, 33 U. S. C. §§ 301-356; and speed
of vessels in ice region, penalty, 46 U. S. C. § 738(c).
4 Petition of Martin (The Mars), 102 F. Supp. 43 (E. D. Pa. 1951) (damage
to a submarine cable); Adams v. Carey, 172 Md. 173, 190 A. 815 (C. A. Md.
1937) (damage to oyster beds); Byrd v. Belcher, 203 F. Supp. 645 (E. D.
Tenn. 1962) (capsizing of motorboat underway and resulting death); R. &
H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., 203 A. 2d 766 (2d
Cir. 1964) (damage to dock caused by maneuvering in an ice field). See
also Motorboat Injury Liability, Annot., 63 A. L. R. 2d 343 (1957), and 80
C. J. S. Shipping, § 76; Griffin, American Law of Collision 593 (1949).
5 Id., C. J. S. and Annot.
6 R. & H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., supra n. 4;
Fawcett v. The Natchez, 3 Woods 16, Fed. Case No. 4703 (1876). See also
Annot. 12 Ann. Cas. 612-616 and 24 R. C. L. 289 (shipping) citing Daniels
v. Carney, 148 Ala. 81, 42 So. 452 (1906).
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surer and is not liable for all damages that occur as a result of
its swell. 7 And further,

The shore itself and the structures thereon are subject to
the dangers incident to the paramount right of navigation,
such as wash from the reasonable propelling of vessels in
the stream and damage to shore installations, by reason of
their location, .. 8
Thus, the issue presents itself. Every vessel sailing on navigable
waters creates a propagating swell by reason of its displacement
in the water. By what yardstick is liability measured as a result
of subsequent swell-damages? Does the paramount right of
navigation absolve a vessel doing a reasonable amount of damage? The answers lie in defining swell damage and the right of
navigation, and in analyzing the case law imposed upon those
who exercise that right.
Swell-Damage
In truth, the swells caused by a vessel's displacement in
water are not as evident as the layman might expect, and much
of the research is as yet uncompleted, especially in determining
the effects of large ships in restricted waters. The article, "Large
Ship Effects in Restricted Waters," 9 provides an excellent treatise on the subject. It describes how a moving vessel floats in a
reduced water level known as "squat" causing a propagating
bow wave, suction, and a following stern wave. This phenomenon is documented by model basin experiments and actual incidents of surge parting mooring lines when the only vessels in
sight were still approaching the dock areas. The authors conclude that (1) squat increases with increases in speed, the rate
of increase being greater with higher speed, and (2) for any
given speed, squat increases with a decrease of water under the
keel.
The tests indicate that a vessel of 77,000 dead weight tons
having a draft of 38 feet and 10 feet of water under the keel
Martin Marine Transportation Co. v. U. S., 66 F. Supp. 673 (D. C. Pa.
1946); The Daniel Drew, 13 Blatchf. 523 (1876).
7

8 R. & H. Development Co. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc. supra n. 4,
at p. 770, citing Adams v. Carey supra n. 4; and Field v. Apple River Log
Driving Co., 67 Wis. 569, 31 N. W. 17 (1887).
9 Breece & Moffitt, Large Ship Effects in Restricted Channels, in, Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council, U. S. Coast Guard, September 1961.
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would squat nearly three feet at a speed of 6.5 knots. 10 This
demonstrates the possibility of a steamer creating a three-foot
drop in the water level around adjacent docks while passing in
a narrow channel. The resultant damage could be extensive.
The Right of Navigation
At early common law, navigable waters were considered to
be under the exclusive control of the government, held in trust
for the public with respect to navigation."' In theory, this has
not changed, and at present every navigable waterway is regarded as a public highway and subject to free and common use
2
by all.1
In Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray,1" the court ruled on
a dispute concerning the exclusive right to operate a glass bottomed sightseeing boat and held:
The public right of navigation entitles the public generally
to the reasonable use of the navigable waters for all legitimate purposes of travel or transportation, for boating or
sailing for pleasure, as well as carrying persons or property
gratuitously or for hire, and in any kind of water craft the
use of which is consistent with others also enjoying the
right possessed in common.
There are also rights incidental to the public right of navigation, best described in Munninghofi v. Wisconsin Conservation
Commission, et al.1 4 These include boating for recreation, bathing, fishing, hunting, use of the bottom for walking (as by a fish-

erman), standing on the bottom while bathing, anchoring, poling
a flatboat, or walking on an ice-covered waterway.
10 Ibid. See also Crenshaw, Naval Shiphandling 153 (1963).
11 65 C. J. S. Navigable Waters, § 20, citing Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 367, 4 P. 2d
369 (1931).
12 City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S. W. 2d 742 (Mo. App. 1959); Swan
Island Club, Inc. v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. C. 1953), aff'd 209 F.
2d 698 (1954); McCauley v. Salmon, 234 Iowa 1020, 14 N. W. 2d 715 (1944);
Daniels v. Carney, supra n. 6. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 229
Ala. 105, 155 So. 601 (1934). Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Sikes, 4 Ga. App. 7,
60 S. E. 868 (1908). Nester v. Diamond Match Co., 105 F. 567 (6th Cir.
1900), 52 LRA 950; as to the use of highways generally see 25 Am. Jur.
Highways § 456.
13 50 F. 2d 356, at 359 (5th Cir. 1931).
14 255 Wis. 252, 38 N. W. 2d 712 (1949). An attempt was made to curtail
these incidental rights in Elder v. Delcour, 241 Mo. App. 839, 263 S. W. 2d
221 (1953), however it was properly reversed, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S. W. 2d 17,
47 A. L. R. 2d 370 (1954).
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The public right of navigation has been held to be so dominant to other rights that under some circumstances the public
may acquire an easement of navigation over lands which are
suddenly flooded. 15 While the right of navigation is paramount,
it is not absolute and does not preclude a regard for the
lawful rights of other parties.' 6 It is best characterized as a
relative right, i.e., a right superior to the other rights associated
with navigable waters, such as the right to create obstructions,1"
riparian rights,' 8 fishing rights, 19 or the right to exclusive use for
private purposes by reason of ownership of lands under the
water.20

In summary, it can be seen that there is a paramount right
to reasonably propel a vessel upon the water, but such right bestows no license to damage another in the process. Assuming
that one party can prove that another's swell caused injury or
damage, the surrounding facts and circumstances determine the
presence or absence of legal fault. The question is: does the
operation of a vessel measure up to the required standard of
care?
15 Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P. 2d 128 (1951). Easement
of navigation in general, see Day v. Armstrong, 362 P. 2d 137 (Wyo., 1961);
Hurley v. American Enka Corp., 93 F. Supp. 98 (E. D. Tenn. 1950); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912); Annot., 41 L. R. A. 372.
16 Carr v. U. S., 136 F. Supp. 527 (E. D. Va. 1955), citing Anderson v. Columbia Contract Co., 94 Or. 171, 184 P. 240, 7 ALR 653 (1919). See also
U. S. v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 65 S. Ct. 761, 89 L. ed 1101
(1945); McCauley v. Salmon, supra n. 12. Natcher v. City of Bowling
Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S. W. 2d 255 (1936); State v. Plant, 130 Me. 261, 155
A. 35 (1931).
17 Petition of Martin (The Mars) supra n. 4; Winans v. Northern States
Power Co., 158 Minn. 62, 196 N. W. 811 (1924) (anchoring). It is unlawful
to obstruct navigable waters, 33 U. S. C. A. § 409.
18 McCauley v. Salmon, supra n. 12; U. S. v. Willow River Power Co.,
supra n. 16; Heiberg v. Wild Rice Boom Co., 127 Minn. 8, 148 N. W. 517
(1914); Henderson v. Doniphan Lumber Co., 94 Ark. 370, 127 S. W. 459, 28
L. R. A. (NS) 144 (1910) (held liable for negligence resulting in death
caused by log jam in river).
19 The Armorica, 189 F. 503 (E. D. N. C. 1911) (damage caused to fishing
nets obstructing navigation).
20 U. S. v. Willow River Power Co., supra n. 16; Silver Springs Paradise
Co. v. Ray, supra n. 13 held even in the absence of a statutory provision
the title, which an owner of highland contiguous to a navigable body of
water has, is at best a qualified one. "Whatever the nature of the interest
of a riparian owner in the submerged lands . . . his title is not as full and
complete as his title to fast land . . . to be held at all times subordinate to
such use of submerged lands and the waters flowing over them as may be
consistent with or demanded by the public right of navigation," citing
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21 S. Ct. 48, 45 L. Ed. 126 (1900); U. S.
v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 3 S. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed.
1063 (1913).
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An Inductive Test: Duty Relation
What are the duties of a navigator exercising his paramount
right of navigation? While everyone has an equal right to use
navigable waters, each must exercise ordinary care and caution,
21
having due regard for the rights, property and lives of others.
The duties of the reasonable man, or prudent seaman, as he is
called in this instance, cannot be precisely stated in advance;
however, the criterion for reasonableness is best defined in
American Jurisprudence22 by way of analogy to use of a public
highway where there must be taken into consideration:
The character of the highway, its location and purposes, and
the necessity, extent and duration of use, under all the
attendant and surrounding circumstances....
Obviously, the duty of the average reasonable man is no
more easily defined here than in other areas of negligence. 23 In
general, any vessel passing piers or docks is obligated to proceed
prudently to avoid creating unusual swells or suction which
24
could damage shoreline installations or properly moored craft.
There is authority requiring the use of extraordinary care
toward smaller vessels. 25 Justice Bradley aptly stated the rule
in 1882:26
The ocean steamer is one of the great inventions of the century, and one of the advanced instrumentalities of modern
civilization; but whilst it may freely exercise its powerful
propeller and sport its leviathan proportions on the ocean
or in deep and open waters, it is justly required to observe
extraordinary care and watchfulness when surrounded by
feebler craft in a crowded harbor.
56 Am. Jur., Waters 671.
22 Id. at 672.
23 Prosser, Law of Torts 153 (3rd ed. 1964).
24 West India Fruit and S. S. Co. v. Raymond, 190 F. 2d 673 (5th Cir.
1951), 1951 A. M. C. 1648; The Hendrick Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 317 (D. C.
N. Y. 1932) (suction parted 4 lines and gangplank); The Priscilla, 15 F. 2d
455 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); The Hendrick Hudson, 163 F. 862 (S. D. N. Y. 1908),
aff'd 168 F. 1021 (2nd Cir. 1909); James Shewan & Sons v. New England
Navigation Co., 155 F. 860 (E. D. N. Y. 1907), re'vd on other grounds, 169
F. 285 (2d Cir. 1909).
25 Williamson v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. N. C. 1958); Moran
v. The M/V Georgie May, 164 F. Supp. 881 (S. D. Fla. 1958); U. S. v. Ladd,
193 F. 2d 929 (4th Cir. 1952); West India Fruit v. Raymond, supra n. 24;
The Emma T. Grimes, 2 F. Supp. 319 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); The Silvia, 2 F.
2d 99 (E. D. N. Y. 1924).
26 The Nevada, 106 U. S. 154 at 159 (1882).
21
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The distance between the offending vessel and the injured is
important, but no specific formula has been found to establish
that distance. One case held that it was unreasonable for a
steamship to pass within a mile of a schooner moored in New
York Harbor.2

1

In a more recent case, 28 the court ruled that a

master having timely notice of a vessel moored at a dock 200
feet from the center of the channel was obligated to see that he
did not enter at such a speed that his swell would create a danger to the moored vessel. The test of foreseeability is frequently
employed to determine liability. Yet, in City of New York v.
McLain Lines, Inc.,29 where a ferryboat traveling at 12 mph was
one-half mile from a tug and allegedly caused swells damaging
the tug, the court concluded:
The ferryboat was not chargeable with duty to foresee that
the swells caused by it were likely to strike the barge before they ran out sufficiently to make them harmless, and
the ferryboat was not liable for the damage.
Naturally, damage is more likely to be foreseeable in a
crowded waterway and, in that instance, the respondent may be
required to show that he reduced speed or directed his course
away from the damaged vessel in an attempt to reduce the reasonable effects of his swell. 30 It was explained in the case of The
Nevada3 ' that incidental inconveniences, such as reduction in
speed, attach to the use of many great improvements of the age.
The court used the analogy of a locomotive being compelled to
reduce speed in passing through cities.
A vessel will be held liable for swell damage caused by excessive speed. 32 The rule laid down in The New York (1888) 33
The Asbury Park, 138 F. 925 (E. D. N. Y. 1905). Compare Dangelo v.
Danforth Co., 192 F. 678 (W. D. N. Y. 1911), and The Chester W. Chapin,
155 F. 854 (E. D. N. Y. 1907).
28 West India Fruit v. Raymond, supra n. 24.
29 147 F. 2d 393 (2d Cir. 1945).
30 Indian Towing Co. v. The Lyons Creek, 187 F. Supp. 774 (E. D. La. 1960),
aff'd 293 F. 2d 107 (5th Cir. 1961); Dufrene v. The Diversity, 163 F. Supp.
331 (E. D. La. 1958); Burns Bros. v. The Systematic, 99 F. Supp. 870 (E. D.
N. Y. 1951).
31 Supra n. 26.
32 Drake v. Inland Waterways Corp., 111 F. Supp. 891 (E. D. Mo. 1953),
1953 A. M. C. 1622; West India Fruit v. Raymond, supra n. 24. Burns v.
The Systematic, supra n. 30; The Providence, 168 F. 564 (E. D. N. Y. 1909);
The Southfield, 19 F. 841 (E. D. N. Y. 1884).
33 34 F. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1888).
27
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has generally prevailed, namely, that a power-driven vessel
which proceeds at such speed as to create a swell causing injury
to another properly handled vessel of a kind properly in the waters which she is navigating, is liable for such injury, even if
that speed is only five or six miles per hour. Excessive speed is
not necessarily conclusive however. In the case of The Washington3

4

two scows were found to be improperly moored, the

damage occurred when one scow traveling at a "somewhat excessive" speed overrode the other. The failure to moor the vessel properly was viewed as the proximate cause of the damage,
and there was no liability. This reasoning is not restricted to
the duty of properly securing a vessel; it also applies to the sea36
worthiness of a vessel 35 or the condition of a shore installation.
There must be an ability to resist ordinary swells where traffic
may be anticipated, 37 and locating the mooring in a dangerous
place may result in defeat for the injured party.38 Some of the
legally imposed duties are noted in O'Donnell TransportationCo.
39
v. M/V Maryland Trader:
Piers and docks along the shoreline are required to be kept
in proper condition and vessels tied up there must be seaworthy and properly moored so as to resist ordinary and
normal swells in narrow waters where heavy traffic may be
anticipated. Some wash from passing vessels is bound to
occur and must be anticipated and guarded against. Only
unusual swells or suction which cannot be reasonably anticipated furnish the basis for a claim.
On the other hand, where a barge is tied up to a wharf, the
barge owner is not required to put out enough lines to hold
securely any other barges which may later tie up to his barge. 40
34

182 F. 885 (E. D. Va. 1910).

35 Drake v. Inland Waterways Corp., supra n. 32; Martin Marine Trans-

portation Co. v. U. S., supra n. 7; The Silvia, supra n. 25; The Reba, 22 F.
546 (S. D. N. Y. 1884) (canal boat was old and unsound).
36 R. & H. Development Corp. v. Diesel Tanker, J. A. Martin, Inc., supra
n. 4. O'Donnell Transportation Co. v. M/V Maryland Trader, 228 F. Supp.
903 (S. D. N. Y. 1963); Drake v. Inland Waterways Co., supra n. 32; James
Shewan & Sons v. New England Navigation Co., supra n. 24.
37 The H. C. Graebner, 66 F. Supp. 456 (E. D. N. Y. 1946); Fawcett v. The
Natchez, supra n. 6; Martin Marine Transportation Co. v. U. S., supra n. 7;
Burns Bros. v. The Systematic, supra n. 30. Williamson v. The Carolina,
supra n. 25.
38 The Hendrick Hudson, 203 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1913).
39
40

Supra n. 36, at p. 909.
Petition of Tracy, 92 F. Supp. 706, aff'd 194 F. 2d 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
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Such is the extent of liability for causing swell damage or
injury. Clear and precise guidelines for determining the duty of
care in each situation are lacking. Perhaps the best statement
was recorded in 187641 and reiterated in 1946:42
There is no rule of law prescribing the speed a boat may
use, or the swell it may make, or how near it may pass to
another upon a public river. It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
An Objective Test: Proximate Cause
Not unlike other causes of action based upon negligence, a
libelant in a swell damage case must show that the respondent's
acts were the proximate cause of the injury or damage. At the
outset, the respondent must be identified as the offending vessel.
Mere presence in the vicinity will not suffice. In O'Donnell
Transportation Co. v. M/V Maryland Trader,43 the court held:
Under these circumstances the Trader cannot be held liable
for any damages to libelant's craft or installations which
may have occurred. Since it was not established that her
movements generated the swells and surges claimed to have
caused the damage, and having shown that she was proceeding at moderate speed with due care and caution, she
was not required to exonerate herself further.
Although failure to foresee and protect a vessel or property
against usual and reasonable swells may be adjudged the proximate cause of damage, 44 causal connection is usually a question
of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion
that the respondent's negligence contributed to the damage; because contributory negligence will not wholly defeat a cause of
45
action in admiralty as it may in common law.
The Daniel Drew, supra n. 7.
Martin Marine Transportation Co. v. U. S., supra n. 7.
43 Supra note 36 at p. 910. See also Byrd v. Belcher, supra n. 4, and Manhattan Lighterage Co. v. New England Navigation Co., 204 F. 270 (2d Cir.
1913).
44 Drake v. Inland Waterways, supra n. 32; The H. C. Graebner, supra n.
37; Williamson v. The Carolina, supra n. 25.
45 Williamson v. The Carolina, supra n. 25; Benedict, American Admiralty
257 (1940); Gilmore & Black, Law of Admiralty 438 (1957). If one vessel is
at fault, that vessel must bear its own loss and pay for the other's dam(Continued on next page)
41

42
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In case of damage or injury to another vessel underway, the
conduct of the libelant is always examined very closely, since
he runs the risk of having caused the result. In Tolle v. Higgins, 46 a fishing boat was capsized by swell created by a tug
pushing a barge, and the death of a fisherman resulted. The
lower court dismissed the libel, asserting that the fishing boat's
failure to maneuver and head into the swell was the proximate
cause of the capsizing. On appeal, 47 however, the court noted
that the tug operator's view was obstructed by logs piled atop
of the barge ahead, and the negligence of a lookout placed on
the logs was found to be the actual cause of the accident.
Clearly, proving a vessel's swell to be the proximate result
of negligence is not a simple matter. 48 Expert testimony on wave
theory should make the task easier, although some courts have
little faith in it.

49

On the other hand, if the respondent is shown to be at statutory fault,50 the burden of proceeding with the evidence may
shift to him. 51 And even where failure to have a proper lookout
is not a statutory fault, it gives rise to a strong inference of
fault, and there is a heavy burden to show clearly and convincingly that such omission was not the proximate cause of the
(Continued from preceding page)
ages. If both are at fault, the damages may be divided equally. An exception occurs when there is gross negligence on one side while the other
party is only technically to blame; then the court may resolve all doubts
in favor of the comparatively innocent vessel, shutting its eyes to what
might otherwise be regarded as fault (major-minor fault doctrine). Compare with "Pennsylvania rule," The Pennsylvania, 86 U. S. 125, 19 Wall.
125, 22 L. Ed. 148 (1873) discussed briefly, infra, n. 50.
46 25 So. 2d 744 (C. A. La. 1946).
212 La. 173, 31 So. 2d 730 (1947).
Western Fuel Oil Terminal Co. v. The Elisha Woods, 89 F. Supp. 862
(W. D. Ky. 1950); Byrd v. Belcher, supra n. 4; Williamson v. The Carolina,
supra n. 25.
49 O'Donnell Transportation Co. v. M/V Maryland Trader, supra n. 36.
50 Indian Towing Co. v. The Lyons Creek, supra n. 30 (running lights not
in conformance with Rules of the Road); Moran v. The Georgie May, supra
n. 25 (wrong side of channel); Kelley Island Lime & Transportation Co. v.
City of Cleveland, 144 F. 207 (N. D. Ohio 1906) (violation of rules for overtaking a vessel by failing to signal). It is of interest that a vessel guilty of
a technical statutory fault may be required to show that her fault not only
did not, but could not, have contributed to the accident to escape liability.
The Pennsylvania, supra n. 45.
47

48

51 McKelvey, Evidence 96 (1944).
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damage. 52 Generally, the presumption of negligence is against
53
the moving vessel.
The issue of proximate cause was paramount in The Kaiser
Wilhelm Der Grosse54 case. The waves of a passing vessel had
caused shifting of the deck cargo of a lighter and eventually a
large amount of cargo was lost overboard. The court denied recovery, holding:
That conceding the correctness of a finding that the respondent steamship produced the swell which caused the
original shifting of the logs, the facts did not show that to
have been the proximate cause of the loss, so as to render
the steamship liable therefor, but rather that it was due to
the negligence of those in charge of the lighter, whose duty
it was to correct the list before subjecting it to additional
overturning force of the boom and the weight at its end.
In questions of swell-damage as in other areas of the law,
"Every why hath a wherefore." 55
Conclusions
In exercising the public right of navigation, the duties of
the peerless, yet equally fictitious, prudent seaman arise.
In Heaven v. Pender 6 the court attempted to formulate a
57
definition for duty without much success, and later attempts
were so imprecise as to render them useless.
No better general statement can be made, than that the
courts will find a duty where, in general,58reasonable men
would recognize it and agree that it exists.
Such definitions are very convenient for the courts but of little
help to those seeking the extent of liability.
Anthony v. International Paper Co., 289 F. 2d 574 (4th Cir. 1961). See
also 33 U. S. C. A. § 221.
53 Ladd v. U. S., 97 F. Supp. 80 (4th Cir. Va. 1951), 1951 A. M. C. 1186,
aff'd, 193 F. 2d 929 (4th Cir. 1952); West India Fruit v. Raymond, supra n.
24; Western Fuel Oil Terminal Co. v. The Elisha Woods, supra n. 48.
54 145 F. 623 (2d Cir. 1906).
55 William Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act II.
56 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
57 Pollock, The Snail in the Bottle and Thereafter, 49 L. Q. Rev. 22 (1933).
Gilmore & Black, Law of Admiralty 420 (1957) asserts: "'Negligence' at
sea does not differ, in principle, from 'negligence' ashore. It is an elastic
and open-textured concept, defined as the correlative of the equally vague
standard of 'due care'; 'good' or 'prudent' seamanship sometimes appears
as a synonym."
58 Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 23, at 334.
52
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Swell-damage cases deal with injury indirectly caused by
a vessel setting up waves which travel to the shore. The waves
are acted upon by environmental forces and their wave energy
dissipates in direct proportion to the distance traveled. The
amount of damage that such a series of waves might cause is
dependent upon the wind, tidal current, depth of water, presence of loose ice, and the physical configuration of the shoreline
or shore installation.5 9
The libelant must show that there was a natural and probable sequence between cause and effect, without too many intervening circumstances, and without which the damage or injury
would not have occurred.
Thus general tort concepts have combined with the peculiarities of sea law and a body of legal principles has emerged
for determining liability for swell damage.
59 Knight, Modern Seamanship, c. 1 (1955).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/11

12

